The risk of recession is serious, and both sides of politics built it
On Melbourne Cup Day the Reserve Bank raised the cash rate to 4.85 per cent. It was the fifth rise this year and it took rates to their highest level since 2008. I think there is a serious risk that this ends in a recession, and I think the cause is an acute failure of policy on both sides of politics. Government has grown faster than the economy can supply, productivity is falling, and the one institution acting on the problem has a tool that works on households alone.
The stake is who pays. A war overseas would leave little to do but wait. A cause at home means the cost households are carrying is a choice, and it could be shared differently.
What I considered
There are four explanations for inflation this high, and each leads somewhere different.
The war. The conflict in the Middle East pushed up fuel and energy prices, and headline inflation jumped from 3.7 to 4.6 per cent in the month it began. I set it aside as the main cause on timing. Inflation was above target before the war started, and the first rate rise of the year came in February, weeks earlier. The Bank's preferred measure, which sets aside the biggest price swings such as fuel, is still running at 3.7 per cent. Comparable economies face the same war, and Australia is the one whose inflation has proved most stubborn.
Private spending. The Treasurer's case is that private demand has surged while public demand has eased. A boom in data centre investment has certainly added to the pressure. I set this aside as the root cause. Private spending is the part of the economy the Reserve Bank can slow, and it has been slowing it all year.
Rates cut too early. The Bank cut three times in 2025 and has since reversed all of it and more. That made things worse. It does not explain why an economy growing at about 2 per cent was already running too hot.
Policy at home. Government has taken a larger share of the economy while the economy's capacity to supply has stalled. This is where I land.
The mechanism
We spent big in the pandemic and never stopped. Governments now account for almost 29 cents of every dollar in the economy. The average for the two decades before the pandemic was 24. That makes government's share 20 per cent bigger, and I can't say my life is 20 per cent better for it.
Productivity, meanwhile, is going backwards. The Reserve Bank expects it to fall this year and puts the economy's speed limit at about 2 per cent growth a year. That is a dismal number for a country that averaged 3 per cent for the past forty years. With the population growing about 1.4 per cent a year, it leaves almost nothing per person. Push past it and you get inflation.
The Reserve Bank can do nothing about either failure. It cannot cut a budget or lift productivity. Its one tool works on private spending, and above all on households with a mortgage. When public spending holds its ground, households have to give up more to bring the total down. The Bank's own forecast is growth of about 1.5 per cent next year and unemployment above 5 per cent. A recession is what happens if that plan works a little too well.
| Measure | Before | Now |
|---|---|---|
| Government's share of the economy | 24 per cent, the average for the two decades before the pandemic | 28.9 per cent |
| Growth the economy can sustain | 3 per cent, the average of the past forty years | About 2 per cent |
| Productivity growth | 1.2 per cent a year, Treasury's long-run assumption in 2023 | A fall of 0.5 per cent forecast for this year |
| Cash rate | 3.60 per cent at the end of 2025 | 4.85 per cent |
Exhibit 1. What changed. Sources are listed at the end.
Who carries it
Households are where the cost falls, and that includes the cost to mental health. Confidence among people with a mortgage is the lowest Westpac has recorded since 1994. Almost half of Australians say the cost of living or their debts have left them more distressed than a year ago.
The harm does not stop with people who lose their jobs. Australian economists followed about five hundred mining workers through fifteen years of commodity price swings. When their jobs felt less secure their mental health fell, and they were still in work. A second study, using eighteen years of national survey data, found that young women suffered most in downturns, especially those in insecure work or from lower-income backgrounds.
We went through a squeeze in the pandemic too, and plenty of people could not pay their mortgage then. About one in ten home loans was put on hold. But the government carried much of the cost, the banks offered that pause openly, and nobody thought the hardship was their fault. This time there is no pause on offer and rates are rising. The households paying did not cause the problem, but that is not how it feels from inside one. Nobody can see a budget or a productivity figure from their kitchen table. What a family can see is its own mortgage. A family that falls behind has to go to its bank alone and ask for hardship help, and that feels like a personal failure. Suicide Prevention Australia has warned that financial distress carries a heavy sense of shame, and people who feel ashamed are slow to ask for help. I run a psychology practice, and that is the part of this I read most closely.
The best objection
The strongest objection is that much of the extra spending is spending people asked for. A good share of it is health, aged care and disability support, and that is a large part of why government's share has risen. My own practice sees clients whose care is paid for in part by Medicare and the NDIS. I accept all of that. The claim here is narrower. A country can choose a larger government, but it has to pay for the choice with higher taxes or a more productive economy, and we have done neither. The bill has gone to people with a mortgage.
A second objection is that the Reserve Bank does not forecast a recession, and that households came through thirteen rate rises in 2022 and 2023. Both are true. But the Bank's forecasts have not held up well lately. Late last year underlying inflation came in 0.8 of a point above what the Bank had predicted only months before, one of its largest misses. And the starting point is weaker this time. Unemployment then was 3.5 per cent and house prices were rising. Unemployment now is 4.7 per cent and house prices are almost 5 per cent below their March peak.
What would change my mind
Two findings would. If underlying inflation fell back inside the target band while government's share of the economy stayed near 29 per cent, then spending was not the constraint I think it is. And if the oil price fell and inflation fell with it, without growth slowing, then the war explained more than I have allowed.
Updates
No updates yet. I revisit every memo within twelve months and record what held and what did not.
Sources
- Statement on Monetary Policy, November 2026, Reserve Bank of Australia
- Statement on Monetary Policy, May 2026, Reserve Bank of Australia
- Australian National Accounts, June 2026, EY
- State Budget Monitor FY27, EY
- 2023 Intergenerational Report, Treasury
- Intergenerational Report findings, SBS News
- Households to bear the brunt of sluggish productivity, CommBank Newsroom
- Inflation is proving more stubborn in Australia than elsewhere, The Conversation
- Inflation unexpectedly surged, Challenger
- Consumer sentiment, November 2026, Westpac
- Community Tracker, Suicide Prevention Australia
- World Commodity Prices, Job Security and Health, Johnston, Shields and Suziedelyte
- Whose mental health declines during economic downturns?, Black, Jackson and Johnston
- Temporary loan repayment deferrals due to COVID-19, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
If you read the numbers differently, I would like to hear how.
Write to me